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Accueil Tous les numéros Volume 42 / Numéro 260 (Octobre 2016) Rev. Fr. Gest., 42 260 (2016) 111-126 Références
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Numéro
Rev. Fr. Gest.
Volume 42, Numéro 260, Octobre 2016
Sciences, techniques et pratiques de gestion. Études de cas
Page(s) 111 - 126
Section Varia
DOI https://doi.org/10.3166/rfg.2016.00072
Publié en ligne 7 décembre 2016
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