Accès gratuit
Numéro
Rev. Fr. Gest.
Volume 43, Numéro 268, octobre 2017
Sciences, techniques et pratiques de gestion
Page(s) 77 - 96
Section Varia
DOI https://doi.org/10.3166/rfg.2017.00178
Publié en ligne 17 janvier 2018
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