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Accueil Tous les numéros Volume 44 / Numéro 272 (avril 2018) Rev. Fr. Gest., 44 272 (2018) 51-67 Références
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Numéro
Rev. Fr. Gest.
Volume 44, Numéro 272, avril 2018
Management de l’innovation collective
Page(s) 51 - 67
Section Varia
DOI https://doi.org/10.3166/rfg.2018.00235
Publié en ligne 3 septembre 2018
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