Authentification abonné
lvrfg
Accueil Tous les numéros Volume 44 / Numéro 274 (juin-juillet 2018) Rev. Fr. Gest., 44 274 (2018) 49-67 Références
Accès gratuit
Numéro
Rev. Fr. Gest.
Volume 44, Numéro 274, juin-juillet 2018
Paradoxes organisationnels : quelles stratégies ?
Page(s) 49 - 67
Section Varia
DOI https://doi.org/10.3166/rfg.2018.00258
Publié en ligne 5 décembre 2018
  1. Acharya A. et Volpin P. (2010). “Corporate governance externalities”, Review of Finance, vol. 14, no 1, p. 1‐33. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  2. Acquier A. et Aggeri F. (2015). « Une généalogie de la pensée managériale sur la RSE », Revue française de gestion, vol. 31, no 2, p. 131‐157. [Google Scholar]
  3. Asker J., Farre-Mensa J. et Ljungqvist A. (2013). “Corporate investment and stock market listing: A Puzzle?”, working paper Stern School of Business. [Google Scholar]
  4. Bancel F. et Garel A. (2015). “Focus on managerial myopia: Do managers privilege the short term”, Bankers Markets & Investors, vol. 135, p. 50‐58. [Google Scholar]
  5. Barton D. (2011). “Capitalism for the long term”, Harvard Business Review, vol. 89, no 3, p. 84‐91. [Google Scholar]
  6. Berle A. et Means G. (1932). The modern corporation and private property, Transaction publishers. [Google Scholar]
  7. Bebchuk L. et Fried J. (2004). Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA. [Google Scholar]
  8. Beyer A., Larcker et Tayan B. (2014). “Does the composition of a company's shareholder base really matter?”, Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Closer Look Series: Topics, Issues and Controversies in Corporate Governance and Leadership no CGRP-42. [Google Scholar]
  9. Bhojraj S., Hribaph P., Picconi M. et Mcinnis J. (2009). “Making sense of cents: An examination of firms that marginally miss or beat analyst forecasts”, Journal of Finance, vol. 64, no 5, p. 2361‐2388. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  10. Bolton P., Scheinkman J. et Xiong W. (2006). “Executive compensation and short-termist behaviour in speculative markets”, Review of Economic Studies, vol. 73, no 3, p. 577‐610. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  11. Borghesi R., Houston J. et Naranjo A. (2014). “Corporate socially responsible investments: CEO altruism, reputation, and shareholder interests”, Journal of Corporate Finance, vol. 26, p. 164‐181. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  12. Bushee B. (1998). “The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior”, Accounting review, vol. 73, no 3, p. 305‐333. [Google Scholar]
  13. Broche F., Loumioti M. et Serafeim G. (2015). “Speaking of the short-term: Disclosure horizon and managerial myopia”, Harvard Business School Accounting & Management Unit, Working Paper no 12 72: 12. [Google Scholar]
  14. Carter M., Lynch L. et Tuna I. (2007). “The role of accounting in the design of CEO equity compensation”, The Accounting Review, vol. 82, no 2, p. 327‐357. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  15. Cronqvist H. et Fahlenbrach R. (2013). “CEO contract design: How do strong principals do it?”, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 108, no 3, p. 659‐674. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  16. Deng X., Kang J.-K. et Low B.S. (2013). “Corporate social responsibility and stakeholder value maximization: Evidence from mergers”, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 110, no 1, p. 87‐109. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  17. Derrien, F., Kecskés A. et Thesmar D. (2013). “Investor horizons and corporate policies”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 48, no 6, p. 1755‐1780. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  18. Derwall J., Koedijk K. et Ter Horst J. (2011). “A tale of values-driven and profit-seeking social investors”, Journal of Banking and Finance, vol. 35, no 8, p. 2137‐2147. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  19. Edmans A. (2011). “Does the stock market fully value intangibles? Employee satisfaction and equity prices”, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 101, no 3, p. 621‐640. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  20. Faulkender M., Kadyrzhanova D., Prabhala N. et Senbet L. (2010). “Executive compensation: an overview of research on corporate practices and proposed reforms”, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, vol. 22, no 1, p. 107‐118. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  21. Foster G. et Gupta M. (1997). “The customer profitability implication of customer satisfaction”, Working paper, Standford University and Washington University St Louis. [Google Scholar]
  22. Freeman R. (1984). Strategic Management: A Stakeholder approach, Pitman Publishing, Inc., Marshfield, Massachussets. [Google Scholar]
  23. Froot K., Scharstein D. et Stein J. (1992). “Herd on the street: Informational inefficiencies in a market with short-term speculation”, Journal of Finance, vol. 47, no 4, p. 1461‐1484. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  24. Garel A. (2016). « Effets réels de la structure de l’actionnariat: impact des investisseurs de long-terme sur les politiques et la performance des entreprises », thèse de doctorat, Université Panthéon Sorbonne et ESCP Europe. [Google Scholar]
  25. Gopalan R., Milbourn T., Song F. et Thakor A. (2014). “Duration of executive compensation”, Journal of Finance, vol. 69, no 6, p. 2777‐2817. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  26. Graham J., Campbell H. et Shiva R. (2005). “The economic implications of corporate financial reporting”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 40, no 1-3, p. 3‐73. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  27. Harford J. et Lai K. (2007). “Decoupling CEO wealth and firm performance: The case for acquiring CEOs”, Journal of Finance, vol. 72, no 2, p. 917‐949. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  28. Healy P. et Wahlen J. (1999). “A review of the earnings management literature and its implication for standard setting”, Accounting Horizons, vol. 13, no 4, p. 365‐383. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  29. Hemmer T. (1996). “On the design and choice of modern management accounting measures”, Journal of Managerial Accounting Research, vol. 8, p. 87‐116. [Google Scholar]
  30. Ittner C. et Larcker D. (1997). “Are non-financial measures leading indicators of financial performance? An analysis of customer satisfaction”, Working paper, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. [Google Scholar]
  31. Jacquet D. (2012). « Quand l’actionnaire remplace le client et détruit sa propre valeur : le cas de Coca-Cola », Entreprises et histoire, vol. 67, no 2, p. 118‐128. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  32. Jensen M. (1993). “The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems”, Journal of Finance, vol. 48, no 3, p. 831‐880. [Google Scholar]
  33. Jensen M. et Meckling W. (1976). “Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 3, no 4, p. 305‐360. [Google Scholar]
  34. Jensen M. et Murphy K. (1990). “CEO incentives. It's not how much you pay, but how”, Harvard Business Review, vol. 3, p. 64‐76. [Google Scholar]
  35. Jensen M. (2002). “Value maximization, stakeholder theory and the corporate objective function”, Business Ethics Quarterly, vol. 12, no 2, p. 235‐256. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  36. Koh P. (2007). “Institutional investor type, earnings management and benchmark beaters”, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, vol. 26, no 3, p. 267‐299. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  37. Kuhnen C. et Zwiebel J. (2009). “Executive pay, hidden compensation and managerial entrenchment”, Woking Paper, Northwestern University. [Google Scholar]
  38. Krüger P. (2015). “Corporate goodness and shareholder wealth”, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 115, no 2, p. 304‐405. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  39. Martinet A. et Reynaud E. (2004). Management stratégique et écologie, Economica. [Google Scholar]
  40. Mizik N. (2010). “The theory and practice of myopic management”, Journal of Marketing Research, vol. 47, no 4, p. 594‐611. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  41. Poterba J. et Summers L. (1995). “A CEO survey of US companies’ time horizons and hurdle rates”, Sloan Management Review, vol. 37, p. 43‐143 [Google Scholar]
  42. Salitskiy I. (2016). “Recent trends in executive compensation: Are they Pareto improving?”, Revue Finance, vol. 37, no 2, p. 7‐36. [Google Scholar]
  43. Sundaram R. et Yermack D. (2007). “Pay me later: Inside debt in managerial compensation”, Journal of Finance, vol. 72, no 4, p. 1552‐1588. [Google Scholar]
  44. Walch J. (2005). “Book review essay: Taking stock of stakeholder management”, Academy of Management Review, vol. 30, no 2, p. 426‐438. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]
  45. Xu R., Taylor G. et Dugan M. (2007). “Review of real earnings management literature”, Journal of Accounting Literature, vol. 26, p. 195‐228. [Google Scholar]
  46. Young S. et Yang J. (2011). “Stock repurchases and executive compensation contract design: The role of earnings per share performance conditions”, The Accounting Review, vol. 86, no 2, p. 703‐733. [CrossRef] [Google Scholar]

Les statistiques affichées correspondent au cumul d'une part des vues des résumés de l'article et d'autre part des vues et téléchargements de l'article plein-texte (PDF, Full-HTML, ePub... selon les formats disponibles) sur la platefome Vision4Press.

Les statistiques sont disponibles avec un délai de 48 à 96 heures et sont mises à jour quotidiennement en semaine.

Le chargement des statistiques peut être long.